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Mississippi State University (USA)
Résumé : Nous introduisons un nouveau modèle de réduction inspiré par ce-
lui de Kemeny et Oppenheim [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] et soutenons que
ce modèle est opérationnel dans une conception « impitoyablement réduction-
niste » des neurosciences actuelles. Le modèle de Kemeny et Oppenheim a été
rapidement rejeté dans la philosophie des sciences du milieu du xxe siècle et
remplacé par des modèles développés par Ernest Nagel et Kenneth Schaffner
[Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. Nous pensons que le modèle de Kemeny et
Oppenheim a été rejeté à juste titre, compte tenu de ce dont une « théorie du
réductionnisme » devait rendre compte à l’époque. Mais leurs idées directrices
à propos de ce qui constitue une réduction scientifique — l’accroissement de
la portée explicative et la systématisation — reflètent les véritables pratiques
des neurosciences réductionnistes actuelles. L’étape clé d’une réhabilitation vi-
sant à accorder leurs idées avec les détails de la science actuelle consiste à les
reformuler à partir de travaux récents sur l’explication causale-mécanique.
Nous commençons avec une étude de cas scientifique, tirée du domaine re-
lativement nouveau de la « cognition moléculaire et cellulaire ». Cette étude
fournit une explication de l’effet d’espacement d’Ebbinghaus sur l’apprentis-
sage et la mémoire, en terme d’interactions entre une protéine activatrice de la
transcription et sa phosphatase inhibitrice de neurones recrutés dans la trace
mnésique. Ensuite, nous décrivons brièvement certains modèles réductionnistes
populaires de la philosophie des sciences du milieu du xxe siècle. Nous remar-
quons comment ces modèles échouent à éclairer des caractéristiques principales
de notre étude de cas scientifique. Finalement, nous présentons notre modèle
causal-mécaniste qui est une mise à jour du modèle de Kemeny et Oppenheim
et soutenons qu’il décrit d’une manière convaincante les éléments de notre
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étude de cas scientifique. Nous terminons avec une remarque qui, avec un
peu de chance, sapera la surprise que beaucoup peuvent ressentir d’apprendre
qu’une explication philosophique longtemps rejetée du réductionnisme est en
réalité à l’œuvre dans l’une des plus importantes entreprises réductionnistes
de la science actuelle.
Abstract: We introduce a new model of reduction inspired by Kemeny and
Oppenheim’s model [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] and argue that this model is
operative in a “ruthlessly reductive” part of current neuroscience. Kemeny and
Oppenheim’s model was quickly rejected in mid-20th-century philosophy of sci-
ence and replaced by models developed by Ernest Nagel and Kenneth Schaffner
[Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. We think that Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model
was correctly rejected, given what a “theory of reduction” was supposed to ac-
count for at that time. But their guiding insights about what constitutes sci-
entific reduction—increases in explanatory scope and systematization—reflect
actual practices of current reductionistic neuroscience. The key rehabilitative
step to make their insights fit current scientific details is to restate them using
resources from recent work on causal-mechanistic explanation.
We begin with a scientific case study, drawn from the relatively new field of
“molecular and cellular cognition”. It provides an explanation of the well-
known Ebbinghaus spacing effect on learning and memory in terms of interac-
tions between a transcriptional enhancer protein and its inhibiting phosphatase
in neurons recruited into the memory trace. Next we briefly describe some
popular models of reduction from mid-20th-century philosophy of science. We
point out how these models fail to illuminate key features of our scientific case
study. Finally we present our causal-mechanistically updated Kemeny and
Oppenheim-inspired model and argue that it nicely accounts for the details of
our scientific case study. We close with a remark that will hopefully undercut
the surprise many may feel to learn that a long-rejected philosophical account
of reduction actually is at work in one of the most prominent reductionistic
endeavors in current science.
1 A case study from recent “ruthlessly
reductionistic” neuroscience
A recent exchange between William Bechtel [Bechtel 2009] and John Bickle
[Bickle 2012] suggests that neuroscience may not speak with one voice about
what reduction(ism) is. Different fields comprising the discipline may work
with fundamentally different understandings of the concept. But it’s difficult
to miss the “ruthlessly” reductionistic tone of a mainstream part of the disci-
pline for the past two decades. In their monumental textbook, Principles of
Neural Science (4th ed.), Eric Kandel, James Schwartz, and Thomas Jessell
remark:
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This book [...] describes how neural science is attempting to link
molecules to mind—how proteins responsible for the activities of
individual nerve cells are related to the complexity of neural pro-
cesses. Today it is possible to link the molecular dynamics of
individual nerve cells to representations of perceptual and mo-
tor acts in the brain and to relate these internal mechanisms to
observable behavior. [Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell 2001, 3–4]
The “today” they speak of was more than one decade ago, and the field of
molecular and cellular cognition continues to do exactly what these authors
describe: manipulate specific genes and proteins in central neurons (in animal
models), and track the effects directly on behavior.
The most direct way into the field of molecular and cellular cognition is
through detailed descriptions of its landmark experimental results. We de-
scribe one such result in this section, but at least 100 other case studies
would illustrate equally well the reductionism that characterizes this field.
Like most first-rate scientific research, our case study was built upon previ-
ous work: on the role of the intraneuronal cyclic adenosine monophosphate
(cAMP)-protein kinase A (PKA)-cyclic AMP-responsive element-binding pro-
tein (CREB) pathway in inducing both late-phase long-term potentiation (L-
LTP) in mammalian hippocampus and cortical neurons, and long-term mem-
ory consolidation.1
Cyclic AMP is a classic second messenger of molecular biology, relaying sig-
nals from the cell surface to other locations in the cell. In one prominent form
of L-LTP (in mammals), a form in which synaptic potentiation can endure
for days up to weeks, high frequency activity in pre-synaptic neurons activate
dopaminergic interneurons that synapse on G-protein coupled receptors on the
post-synaptic target cell.2 Dopamine binding to these receptors prime adenylyl
and adenylate cyclase molecules, which convert adenosine triphosphate (ATP)
molecules into cellular energy and cAMP. Increased cAMP molecules in the
post-synaptic neuron bind to regulatory subunits of PKA molecules, freeing up
1. Consolidation is the process by which labile, easily disrupted short-term mem-
ories are converted into more stable long-term form.
2. We are about to inundate readers with a large dose of molecular neuroscience.
This background is important for understanding the specific manipulations performed
in the landmark experiment we’ll describe below, and for understanding the rationale
behind the experimental manipulations performed and the significance of the results.
One of us (Bickle) often describes work at this level of neurobiological detail to
develop philosophical points, and tends to aim at the excessive descriptive extreme
rather than the deficient. Other philosophers of science are less patient with this
amount of scientific detail. (We thank Colin Allen for calling our attention to this
particular worry.) The key point to emphasize here is that the scientific background
details matter to the argument to come. Besides, what’s wrong with learning some
details about state-of-the-art work in current neuroscience? For those who find the
background details presented here too sparse to be comprehensible, see Bickle [Bickle
2003, chap. 2] for a more complete description and some additional helpful diagrams
reprinted from the original publications.
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catalytic PKA subunits to translocate to the post-synaptic neuron’s nucleus.
There PKA catalytic subunits phosphorylate CREB molecules, with phospho-
rylated (pCREB) α and δ isoforms serving as gene transcriptional enhancers.
pCREB enhances gene transcription and subsequent protein synthesis for reg-
ulatory proteins (like ubquitin carboxyl-terminal hydrolase), which keep cat-
alytic PKA subunits unbound from regulatory subunits and active even after
the transient rise in cAMP returns to baseline levels. It also enhances tran-
scription for other transcriptional enhancers (like CCAAT enhancer binding
protein), which activate gene transcription for structural proteins that reshape
the post-synaptic density, anchoring once-hidden AMPA receptors into active
sites. The result is a potentiated synapse with increased numbers of active
AMPA receptors, poised now to deliver stronger excitatory post-synaptic po-
tentials (EPSPs) upon subsequent pre-synaptic glutamate release, and ulti-
mately higher probabilities of action potential generation in response to the
inducing pattern of excitatory pre-synaptic neurotransmission.
Work from Alcino Silva’s lab in the mid-1990s established long-term mem-
ory deficits in CREB “knock-out” mice [Bourtchouladze, Frenguelli, Blendy
et al. 1994], i.e., genetically engineered mutant mice lacking the gene for CREB
α and δ isoforms. These mice were deficient in remembering the location of
the hidden platform in the Morris water maze task. More impressively, the
mutants were intact on a short-term context-shock association task (compared
to wild-type [non-mutated] littermate control mice), but were markedly defi-
cient on the long-term version of the same task.3 This second experiment
3. The Morris water maze is a spatial memory task in which rodents are plunged
into a pool of opaque liquid. Being hydrophobic, they try to escape the pool, to no
avail, but eventually discover a platform underneath the surface of the opaque liquid
they can climb on and take refuge. The pool is located in a room with variously
shaped visually accessible displays at specific locations on the walls. On one standard
protocol, the platform remains at the same location through numerous training trials,
and mice are released into the pool at random locations on each trial. With repeated
training trials, mice eventually learn the location of the platform relative to the
visual displays, and quickly head for it regardless of where in the pool they are
released. Reduction in time required to locate and stand on the platform is one
standard measure of spatial memory for the platform’s location vis-à-vis the visual
clues. Another common measure is percentage of time spent in the quadrant where
the platform had been located during training on “probe” trials in which the platform
is removed.
Context-shock association involves exposing the rodent for a short exploratory
period (e.g., 2 minutes) to a novel training context (e.g., a new cage environment). At
the end of the exploratory period a significant aversive stimulus is delivered (typically
a strong foot shock through a floor grid). The animal is removed from the context
for a specified delay period (30 minutes to 1 hour for short-term memory testing,
24-48 hours for long-term memory testing), then returned to the environment. The
common measure for context-shock fear memory is the amount of time the rodent
spends “freezing” when returned to the context. Freezing is a stereotypic rodent fear
response in which the animal hunches over, tucks its front paws under its chest, and
ceases all movements except breathing. Nice features of context-fear conditioning are
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implicated the cAMP-PKA-CREB pathway as a key molecular mechanism
specifically for memory consolidation. Since that publication, experimenters
have used a variety of more sophisticated techniques for intervening into CREB
gene transcription, and a wide variety of behavioral memory tasks. A com-
mon pattern of results consistently has been found: intact short-term memory
but impaired long-term memory on the same task in mice with reduced hip-
pocampal and cortical CREB activity; and enhanced long-term memory in
mice with increased CREB activity. Recently Han et al. have presented im-
pressive evidence that pCREB functions directly in interneuronal competition
for inclusion in memory traces for specific stimuli [Han, Kushner, Yi et al.
2007]. Neurons with more pCREB activity at the time of training are re-
cruited with significantly higher probability into the memory trace for that
stimulus than are those with less pCREB activity at training time.
pCREB activity itself is modulated in neurons by protein phosphatase-1
(PP1). PP1 when activated removes the phosphate group from CREB
molecules, rendering them inactive as gene transcriptional enhancers. Both
CREB and PP1 activity is neuron-activity dependent. The higher frequency
of action potentials a neuron generates (up to a ceiling frequency), the higher
will be its concentration of pCREB molecules available as transcriptional
enhancers. But the same is true for CREB’s inhibiting phosphatase, PP1.
Furthermore, PP1 activity is modulated by another protein, Inhibitor 1 (I1).
This pathway of intraneuronal interactions suggests the following molecular-
genetic intervention strategy: increasing the level of active I1 molecules should
decrease the activity of PP1, which in turn should increase the transcriptional
activity of pCREB, which in turn should increase L-LTP at active synapses and
generate better performance on the memory tasks known to involve pCREB.
Furthermore, by blocking the normal interplay of pCREB and PP1 by ac-
tivating more I1, experimenters could investigate the role that pCREB-PP1
interaction plays in normal neuronal function, and learning and memory.
David Genoux and his collaborators in Isabelle Mansuy’s lab succeeded
in constructing viable I1∗ mutant mice [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al.
2002]. They used a reversible tetracycline-controlled transactivator system so
that the I1∗ transgene (inserted into embryonic stem cells) was only expressed
when the engineered mice were dosed with doxycycline. Standard biochem-
ical and molecular biological assays showed that the transgene was properly
placed, and functional in both hippocampal and cortical neurons. The exper-
imenters also linked the I1∗ transactivator system to a α-calmodulin kinase II
(αCamKII) promoter, which limited transgene expression under doxycycline
dosage principally to forebrain regions. Transgenic I1∗ mice were viable and
showed no apparent phenotypic abnormalities.
that its long-term version is a hippocampus-dependent task that can be learned in a
single trial, and it can be coupled with an amygdala-dependent fear conditioning task
(e.g., Pavlovian tone-shock conditioning) to control for motivational and behavioral
confounds of the genetic mutations [Abel, Nguyen, Barad et al. 1997].
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For their behavioral protocol, Genoux and colleagues chose a much-studied
rodent non-spatial object recognition task. I1∗ transgenic and wild-type litter-
mate control mice were exposed to a variety of differently shaped mouse-sized
objects presented alone (small toys, refuse objects, and the like) and were
permitted to explore that object for a specified training time (more on the
exact times utilized below). After a delay period, mice were exposed to a
pair of objects, one from the training set previously encountered and another
novel object not presented before. (Locations of previously presented and
novel objects in the test apparatus were varied randomly to insure the non-
spatiality of this memory test.) Mice are naturally curious, and when offered
a choice will explore novel objects for greater durations than objects they re-
member encountering. So the exploratory discrimination time ratio during the
testing phase, time exploring the novel object/summed total time exploring
both objects, gives a useful measure of strength of memory for the previously
presented object. Exploratory ratios >50% indicate some memory for the
previously encountered object, since they indicate that the mouse spent more
time exploring the novel object during the testing phase. Higher exploratory
ratios indicate stronger memories for the previously presented object, since
the mouse virtually ignored it during the testing phase.
Genoux and colleagues chose their time parameters to reflect the well-
known Ebbinghaus spacing effect for learning and memory. This effect is
so named because it was first explored systematically by German psychol-
ogist Hermann Ebbinghaus in the late 19th century using human memory
for nonsense syllables. This effect is one thing we warn our undergradu-
ate students to avoid: don’t cram for the exam starting the night before!
Learning and memory improves when training is divided into multiple ses-
sions, with longer times (up to a limit) separating the learning sessions.
In more technical terms, longer-interval distributed training produces bet-
ter learning and stronger memories for training materials than does either
briefer-interval distributed training—shorter intervals separating the multiple
learning sessions—or massed training—where all learning is crammed into a
single session. One cognitive-level explanation for this effect is that, with fre-
quent repetitive training (massed or briefer-interval distributed), information
acquired on the previous trial is still being processed when new input arrives,
and that longer delays are required to complete input integration [Spear &
Riccio 1994]. This explanation is not only limited in scope: why does learn-
ing and memory require “complete integration”? Why can’t later stages of
the memory process function on previously acquired information while ear-
lier stages handle the new inputs? The cognitive-level story doesn’t answer
those crucial questions. This cognitive-level explanation also seems ad hoc—
motivated solely to capture Ebbinghaus spacing data, but with no obvious
generalization capacities or explanatory motivations beyond these data. As
we’ve already stressed above, this is not true of the molecular-level explana-
tion. It connects quit naturally with already-established molecular-mechanism
work. So as Genoux et al. correctly assess, the Ebbinghaus spacing effect and
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other “time-dependent constraints on learning and memory are poorly under-
stood” [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002, 971].
For their I1∗ transgenic and wild-type control mice, Genoux and colleagues
gave all groups 25 minutes training time with each object presented individu-
ally in the training set [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002]. The massed
training group had all 25 minutes crammed into a single training session with
each object. The briefer-interval distributed training group had their 25 min-
utes training with each object broken into 5× 5-minute training episodes, each
separated from the next by a 5-minute non-training interval. The longer-
interval distributed training group also had their 25 minutes training with
each object broken into 5× 5-minute training sessions, but each training ses-
sion was separated from the next by a 15 minute non-training interval. Mice
were further divided into three control groups (wild-types, I1∗ transgenics not
dosed with doxycycline [off dox], and I1∗ transgenics dosed previously with
doxycycline but now off doxycycline due to normal drug metabolism [on/off
dox]), and one experimental group (I1∗ transgenics on doxycycline [on dox]).
Tests with pairs of a previously presented object and a novel object occurred
5 minutes after the last training session, 3 hours after, and 24 hours after. (See
Figure 1a.)
Behaviorally, with all control groups, Genoux and collaborators got
the standard Ebbinghaus spacing effect (see Figure 1b) [Genoux, Haditsch,
Knobloch et al. 2002]. Exploratory ratios for control mice were statistically
significantly higher only with longer-interval distributed training. I1∗ trans-
genics on dox, however, showed statistically significantly higher exploratory
ratios with both briefer-interval distributed training and longer-interval dis-
tributed training, with no statistically significant differences between these
two training regimens. In other words, increasing I1 to block PP1 to keep
pCREB active during training episodes produces a kind of Ebbinghaus spac-
ing effect super-learner: mice who remember encountering objects previously
under briefer-interval distributed training with a strength wild-type mice can
only achieve with longer-interval distributed training. Equally importantly,
discrimination ratios returned to wild-type levels in I1∗ transgenics on/off
dox (see Figure 1c), indicating that increased I1 activity prior to training did
not improve memory performance. Exploration times during training sessions
also did not differ between I1∗ transgenics on dox and all control groups (see
Figure 1d). All groups spent statistically identical amounts of time during
training exploring the individually presented objects.
This landmark MCC study presents evidence for an intriguing causal-
mechanistic molecular explanation of the Ebbinghaus spacing effect. It sug-
gests that the effect results from an intraneuronal interaction between activity-
dependent pCREB and activity-dependent PP1. In massed training (and
briefer-interval distributed training), action potential frequency in neurons
recruited into the memory trace for the stimulus activates both, and the
PP1 activity inhibits the pCREB activity, limiting L-LTP and memory (see
Figure 2a). In longer-interval distributed training, action potential frequency
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Figure 1: Results from [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002] experiment. (a)
Training and testing regimens for massed (top row), briefer-interval distributed (mid-
dle row), and longer-interval distributed training (bottom row) groups. (b) Control
mice showed significantly improved object recognition memory only during longer-
interval distributed training, displaying the characteristic Ebbinghaus spacing effect.
I1∗ mutant mice on dox showed significantly improved object recognition memory
on both briefer-interval distributed training and longer-interval distributed training,
displaying discrimination ratios on briefer-interval distributed training statistically
identical to ratios displayed by control mice only on longer-interval distributed train-
ing. (c) This improvement was not present in I1∗ mutants dosed with doxycycline
previously but off dox at training time due to normal drug metabolism. (d) This ef-
fect was not due to different exploratory times with individual objects during training
sessions. See text for detailed explanation. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan
Publishers Ltd: Nature, [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002, 971, Figure 1],
©2002.
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in recruited neurons is diminished enough (by the longer intervals separating
training sessions) to generate sufficient pCREB activity but dampened PP1
activity, generating strong L-LTP and stronger memory performance for the
training stimulus (see Figure 2b). The I1∗ mutants on dox have engineered
decreases in PP1 due to the additional activity of the I1∗ transgene and its pro-
tein products, enabling pCREB to have similar effects during briefer-interval
distributed training that it only has during longer-interval distributed training
in experimental control mice (see Figure 2c). But could Genoux et al. also
show that pCREB activity in hippocampal and cortical neurons was similar
in I1∗ mutants on dox during briefer-interval distributed training, compared
to all groups during longer-interval distributed training [Genoux, Haditsch,
Knobloch et al. 2002]? That result, against the backdrop of what was already
known about pCREB as a molecular mechanism of certain forms of mem-
ory consolidation, would be strong additional evidence for the pCREB-PP1
interaction hypothesis as a molecular mechanism of the Ebbinghaus spacing
effect.
Figure 2: Learning and forgetting as a tale of molecular antagonism in neurons
recruited into the memory trace. (a) During massed training (and briefer-interval
distributed training), increased action potential frequency in neurons recruited into
the memory trace for the stimulus activates both pCREB and its inhibiting phos-
phatase PP1, rendering CREB inactive, and producing little synaptic potentiation or
learning. (b) During (longer-interval) distributed training, lessened action potential
frequency in recruited neurons is sufficient to activate pCREB, but insufficient to ac-
tivate PP1, producing long-lasting synaptic potentiation and enhanced learning and
memory. (c) In I1∗ mutant mice on dox, increased I1 activity inactivates increased
PP1 activity produced by massed or briefer-interval distributed training, producing
long-lasting synaptic plasticity, and learning and memory, statistically identical to
wild-type mice on longer-interval distributed training. Reprinted by permission from
Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature, [Silva & Josselyn 2002, 930, Figure 1], ©2002.
Genoux et al. obtained this last result [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al.
2002]. They inserted a β-galactosidase gene whose expression and subsequent
protein synthesis were tied to a sudden high concentration of pCREB in the
neuron. In other words, neurons in these mice with high pCREB activity dur-
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ing object recognition training will express a gene whose synthesized protein
makes the neuron glow blue under standard light microscope observation. Mice
from each of the groups were sacrificed after object recognition training, slices
were cut through cortex and hippocampus, and highly pCREB-positive neu-
rons (those that glowed blue) literally were counted. If increased pCREB ac-
tivity due to lowered PP1 inhibition in longer-interval distributed training is an
intraneuronal molecular mechanism of the Ebbinghaus spacing effect, then in
[Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002] various control groups we should see
a statistically significant increase in high pCREB-neurons only in the longer-
interval distributed training groups. In I1∗ transgenics on dox, however, we
should see similar numbers of high pCREB-neurons in both briefer-interval dis-
tributed and longer-interval distributed training groups. That’s exactly what
Genoux et al. found (see Figure 3) [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002].
The number of neurons with high pCREB concentrations per mm3 more than
doubled in control animals for only the longer-interval distributed training
groups. The significant increases were found in I1∗ mutants on dox in both
briefer-interval distributed and longer-interval distributed training groups.
Figure 3: Control mice showed statistically significant increased numbers of neurons
with high pCREB levels only on longer-interval distributed training. I1∗ mutant
mice showed statistically identical increases on both briefer-interval distributed and
longer-interval distributed training. See text for detailed discussion. Reprinted by
permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature, [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch
et al. 2002, 972, Figure 3a], ©2002.
These data are impressive experimental evidence for an intriguing “ruth-
lessly reductive” hypothesis: The Ebbinghaus spacing effect, a paradigmatic
psychological kind, reduces to the intraneuronal interactions between pCREB,
a transcriptional enhancer already established to be a molecular mechanism
of a variety of forms of memory consolidation, and PP1, its inhibiting phos-
phatase, in hippocampal and cortical neurons recruited into the memory trace.
Genoux et al. established this hypothesis for the paradigmatic case of non-
spatial hippocampus-dependent object recognition memory in mice [Genoux,
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Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002]. The broader background of pCREB’s already-
established role in a variety of forms of memory consolidation, the ubiquity
of CREB-PP1 interactions in all types of neurons (and in biological tissue
types generally), and the comparative molecular genetics and proteinomics of
CREB and PP1 across species4 suggest a far broader application of this reduc-
tive hypothesis. And the principal experimental evidence offered in its support
involves tracking the behaviors that experimentally operationalize the psycho-
logical kind, in light of precise experimental interventions that positively or
negatively manipulate components of intraneuronal molecular signaling path-
ways.5 For it is the outcomes these mechanisms generate in central neurons
whose effects are transmitted through the nervous system to the behavioral
periphery, to generate the observed patterns of behavioral data.
Clearly the science here is impressive. But in our interpretation of what
the science accomplished, do we have an instance of philosophers suggesting
lessons that the scientists would resist? We do not. Genoux et al. clearly
advocate having found a molecular mechanism for the Ebbinghaus spacing
effect [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002]. They note that their results
“show that protein phosphatase 1 (PP1) determines the efficiency of learning
and memory by limiting acquisition and favoring memory decline” [Genoux,
Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002, 970]. PP1 “regulates both the acquisition
and retention of information” [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002, 974].
These are claims of a discovered molecular mechanism directly for a cogni-
tive function, made by the scientists who performed the experiments. In a
“News and Views” commentary published in the same issue, neurobiologists
Alcino Silva and Sheena Josselyn drew equally bold conclusions. Studies of
“the molecular and cellular foundations of cognitive processes” had now “come
of age” with “the birth of a field that is unraveling the basis of learning, re-
membering, and now [...] forgetting” [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch et al. 2002,
4. The nucleotide sequence of a cloned Aplysia CREB1 gene and the amino acid se-
quence of one of its predicted protein products, the CREB1a polypeptide isoform, dis-
played 95% amino acid sequence homology to mammalian CREB proteins—meaning
that, across a gastropod and mammals, 19 out of every 20 amino acids residues in the
protein sequences were identical [Bartsch, Casadio, Karl et al. 1998]. The key phos-
phorylation consensus site in the proteins’ phosphorylation (P) boxes, the site where
freed PKA catalytic subunits attach a phosphate group to activate the transcrip-
tion enhancer, was completely conserved across Aplysia CREB1a and mammalian
CREB, meaning that every amino acid residue in the P box sequences across species
was identical. Based on these and other cross-species comparisons, insect biologists
Josh Dubnau and Tim Tully, in a much-cited Annual Review of Neuroscience pub-
lication, wrote “elucidation of the role of CREB-mediated transcription in long-term
memory in flies, LTP and long-term memory in vertebrates, and long-term facili-
tation in A. californica suggest that CREB may constitute a universally conserved
molecular switch for long-term memory” [Bartsch, Casadio, Karl et al. 1998, 438; our
emphasis].
5. For a detailed description of the full experimental methodology at work in
MCC, see [Silva & Bickle 2009] for a chapter-length treatment, and [Silva, Landreth
& Bickle in press] for the full book-length treatment.
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929]. Genoux and colleagues “report that an enzyme known as protein phos-
phatase 1 (PP1) actively suppresses memories in mice” [Genoux, Haditsch,
Knobloch et al. 2002, 929].
Like other biological processes, memory is regulated by the
yin-and-yang-like interactions between molecules with opposing
functions—in this case, protein phosphatases and kinases, which
respectively remove and add phosphate groups on target proteins,
thereby altering their properties. [Genoux, Haditsch, Knobloch
et al. 2002, 929]
Notice the phrasing: memory is regulated by these molecules. CREB and
PP1 are claimed to be memory’s mechanisms. These are the published in-
terpretations of the scientists themselves, not of some reckless philosophical
reductionists.
With a detailed example of current “ruthlessly reductive” neuroscience be-
fore us, let’s next assess how well some prominent models of reduction from
the philosophy of science illuminate its key aspects.
2 Classic philosophical models of reduction
The still-dominant theory of reduction from the philosophy of science is Ernest
Nagel’s model [Nagel 1961], according to which reduction is logical deduction
(derivation) of the reduced theory (TR) from the reducing (TB). In most
interesting scientific reductions, where the TB is more than just a simple ex-
tension of TR, TR will contain theoretical terms not contained in TB. ([Nagel
1961] called such cases “heterogeneous” reductions.) To affect anything other
than a trivial derivation of TR in these cases, various statements must be
added to TB to “connect” the disparate vocabularies. The logical status and
ontological import of these ‘bridge principles’, ‘correspondence rules’, ‘coordi-
nating definitions’, or ‘connectability conditions’ has been a central concern of
the [Nagel 1961] model since its inception.
Paul Feyerabend quickly and famously took Nagel’s model to task, argu-
ing that it did not accurately represent reduction in actual scientific practice
[Feyerabend 1962]. This is because actual reductions do not proceed via logical
deduction and it is unreasonable to reconstruct them as doing so. According
to Feyerabend, Nagel’s condition of derivability is not met even in the sup-
posedly paradigmatic reduction of Galilean to Newtonian mechanics. What
is derivable from Newtonian mechanics is a set of laws that is empirically in-
distinguishable from those of Galilean mechanics—indistinguishable based on
the observable evidence that forms the inductive basis for the latter. However,
this derivable set is also logically inconsistent with actual Galilean mechan-
ics. And the Galilean-to-Newtonian mechanics case is not an anomaly. It
is precisely what we should expect from attempts to meet Nagel’s condition
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of derivability. So the condition of derivability is an unreasonable constraint
on explanation and reduction. Instead of its laws being logically derived from
Newtonian mechanics (plus the appropriate correspondence rules), Feyerabend
argued that the ontology of Galilean mechanics is instead eliminated in favor
of that of Newtonian mechanics. Reduction is thus not a logical relationship
between theories. It is the replacement of the reduced theory’s ontology by
the reducing theory’s incommensurate alternative ontology.
Kenneth Schaffner [Schaffner 1967] incorporated key elements of Nagel’s
[Nagel 1961] model while acknowledging some of Feyerabend’s lessons about
corrective reductions in science. According to Schaffner’s “general” model, it
isn’t the actual reduced theory TR that gets deduced in a reduction. Rather,
what gets deduced is a corrected version of TR, T∗R, strongly analogous to TR.
And Nagel’s logically and ontologically problematic rules of correspondence for
Schaffner became “reduction functions” from terms of TB onto the terms from
T∗R missing in TB’s laws or generalizations. Reduction functions had the
ontological import of synthetic identities between the referents of the terms
from the reducing and corrected reduced theories. In this fashion, interesting
scientific reductions show where and why the actual reduced theoryTR worked
as well as it did when it did, and where and how it was mistaken.
Does the Nagel (1961)-Schaffner (1967) model of reduction illuminate the
type of reduction at work in MCC, documented in the detailed case study in
section 1 above? It does not. Yet contra Feyerabend, Nagel’s derivability re-
quirement, even modulo Schaffner’s T∗R supplement, is only a symptom of the
real problem. The real problem is that in MCC reductions there are no theories
to be derived from one another. The psychological “theory”, the Ebbinghaus
spacing effect, is simply a pattern of behavior in the training regimen and sub-
sequent memory tests. The neurobiological “theory” is simply a description of
a causal mechanism, the interaction between an activity-dependent transcrip-
tional enhancer protein and its activity-dependent inhibiting phosphatase, the
subsequent effects on gene transcription and protein synthesis in hippocampal
and cortical neurons, and neural transmission effects out to the motor periph-
eries that generate the measured behavior. However it turns out to be that
we best characterize what is going on in cases like this, reconstructing it as a
logical derivation of one theory from another will do this science a disservice
in two ways: derivation as the appropriate reduction relationship, and theories
as the appropriate relata.
Fortunately there is a model of reduction from the philosophy of science,
from the decade prior to Nagel [Nagel 1961] and Schaffner [Schaffner 1967],
built on insights that do illuminate our neuroscience example. Paradoxically,
it is a model that has been by and large forgotten in the philosophy of science
except for its historical role: John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim’s model
[Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956]. Unlike Nagel’s (1961) model and Schaffner’s
(1967) revision, Kemeny and Oppenheim’s (KO) model does not require any
cross-theoretical correspondence rules or reduction functions. Early in the
essay they insist: “It is not the case that the vocabulary of [reduced theory
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TR] is in any simple way connected with the vocabulary of [reducing theory
TB]” [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956, 13].6 Their account only requires that the
reducing theory explain or predict all of the observational data explained or
predicted by the reduced theory.
Since KO reduction has been virtually forgotten in current philosophy
of science, we elaborate on some details. A KO reduction has two basic
requirements. First, it requires that TB “fulfill the role” played by TR,
meaning its explanatory role. TB must explain all the observational data
that TR explained. Typically a TB has greater explanatory scope—it ex-
plains more observational data than TR explains. Second, TB must be at
least as well systematized as TR. For Kemeny and Oppenheim, reduction
is a kind of scientific progress that increases both of these measures [Kemeny
& Oppenheim 1956].
Systematization is a virtue of theories that balances simplicity with ex-
planatory power. It is a measure of how well the increased complexity of TB
is compensated for by the increase in the amount of observational data it ex-
plains. While simplicity is an important virtue of theories, for Kemeny and
Oppenheim typically it is outweighed by increased explanatory power. A sim-
pler theory can be reduced to a more complex one if the more complex theory
is significantly stronger in explanatory power. In such a case, it “would seem
reasonable to allow it some additional complexity” [Kemeny & Oppenheim
1956, 11]. Kemeny and Oppenheim continue:
What our intuition tells us is that we must be satisfied that
any loss in simplicity is compensated for by a sufficient gain
in the strength of the body of the theories. We need some
measure that combines strength and simplicity, in which addi-
tional complexity is balanced by additional strength. Let us ex-
press this combined concept by talking about how well a the-
ory is systematized[...] We will then require that the reducing
theory be at least as well systematized as the theory reduced.
[Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956, 11]
6. Interestingly, Kemeny and Oppenheim [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] began
their account with a criticism of Ernest Nagel’s account—[Nagel 1951], that is.
According to Kemeny and Oppenheim, Nagel’s [Nagel 1951] account was logically
too strong: it excluded actual cases of reduction that any account should include.
They argued that this failure was unavoidable on any model of reduction that as-
serts direct connections between theoretical terms across TR and TB via connecting
principles of any sort.
One further note: Kemeny and Oppenheim’s account is explicitly one of theory
reduction. We’ve emphasized above that molecular and cellular cognition doesn’t
contain theories in the standard philosophy of science senses. So obviously we’ll later
be offering a Kemany-Oppenheim-inspired account of reduction, modified to relate
something other than theories in the sense that their original account proposes. That
will be the topic of section 3 below. Thanks to Colin Allen for pointing out this
potential worry about our goal.
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In other words, TB’s increased complexity must be balanced by a similar
increase in explanatory power, as compared to the ratio we find in TR.
However, Kemeny and Oppenheim never develop this notion in formal de-
tail. As Schaffner noted a decade later, “the notion is apparently an intuitive
one” [Schaffner 1967, 140].
We stress two features of KO reduction that are especially salient for our
argument. First, any “connection” between TB and TR is indirect. Speaking
explicitly of Nagel (1951), Kemeny and Oppenheim acknowledge that any
attempt to establish a “direct connection” between two theories will require
translation of the vocabulary of one into the other. But, they argue, “it is en-
tirely possible that a theory should be able to explain all facts that another can,
without there being any method of translation” [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956,
our emphasis]. Notice that in an important sense their criticism anticipated
Feyerabend’s [Feyerabend 1962] better-known attack on Nagel’s [Nagel 1961]
conditions of derivability and connectivity. A second feature of KO reduction
is that, although it was formulated within a broadly logical empiricist con-
ception of science, it is less dependent on some central—and no longer widely
accepted—details of the logical empiricist program than is the Nagel/Schaffner
model.
The Nagel/Schaffner model relies heavily on the now-widely dismissed
Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of explanation.7 The D-N model is not
only at work in their presentations of stock examples of reductionist explana-
tions (e.g., the free-fall of bodies near the earth’s surface, mercury’s expansion
in a thermometer). Nagel and Schaffner both assume the D-N model in a
more fundamental way. A Nagel/Schaffner reduction is itself a species of D-N
explanation, where the TB is part of the explanans and the TR or T∗R is
the explanandum. A successful Nagel/Schaffner reduction—a valid derivation
of TR or T∗R from TB and correspondence rules or reduction functions—
demonstrates that the reduced theory is a logical consequence of the reducing
theory. In this way, and directly in keeping with the D-N model, TB explains
TR or T∗R. Separating Nagel’s and Schaffner’s guiding intuitions about what
a reduction is from the broader philosophy of science it was expressed within
is thereby not an easy task. Without the D-N model’s backing, why else think
that reduction involves logical deduction of the reduced (corrected or not) from
the reducing theory?
Kemeny and Oppenheim’s motivating insight—that reduction is a
kind of scientific progress that involves increased explanatory scope and
systematization—does not rely on the D-N account for its principal motivation.
7. The D-N model goes back to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim [Hempel &
Oppenheim 1948], reprinted in [Hempel 1965]. According to this view, explana-
tions are arguments, with the statement to be explained (the ‘explanandum’) derived
validly (hence ‘deductive’) from a set of premises (the ‘explanans’), at least one of
which is a scientific law (hence ‘nomological’). Hempel and others added numer-
ous additional conditions on the basic D-N model to try to account for a variety of
different kinds of scientific explanations.
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True, they did express their motivating insights using concepts from the log-
ical empiricist program, including D-N explanation. But one can hold these
insights about what reduction is and express them using a variety of differ-
ent models of scientific explanation. The independence of their insights from
the concepts they happened to use to express them makes their model of re-
duction more easily adaptable to fit within, for example, the recently revived
framework of causal-mechanistic explanation.
Before we develop that account, we hope the reader feels the intuitive
pull of where we’re headed. Psychology’s contribution to the case study in
section 1 above, the Ebbinghaus spacing effect, is a pattern of behavior in
different training regimens and subsequent memory tests. Our case study de-
scribed direct experimental evidence for the hypothesis that the Ebbinghaus
spacing effect reduces to the interactions between a transcriptional enhancer
molecule (pCREB) and its inhibiting phosphatase (PP1) in central (hippocam-
pal and cortical) neurons recruited into the memory trace during training, and
suitably connected to the motor periphery to affect the measured behavioral
patterns. The evidence for the reductive hypothesis is that manipulating the
hypothesized molecular mechanism, suitably embedded in the larger nervous
and motor systems, generates—and thereby causal-mechanistically explains—
the behavioral data. This molecular mechanistic explanation both increases
explanatory scope and systematization: exactly the features that KO reduc-
tion emphasized. Let’s now turn to some details of the account.
3 KO reduction and causal-mechanistic
explanation
Kemeny and Oppenheim’s account of reduction was dismissed quickly [Kemeny
& Oppenheim 1956]; consensus in mid-20th-century philosophy of science
quickly settled on the stronger conditions on reduction offered by Nagel [Nagel
1961] and Schaffner [Schaffner 1967]. But in light of the nature of reductions
being developed in current mainstream neuroscience, illustrated by our case
study and not illuminated by the Nagel/Schaffner model, we think it is time
to reconsider the principal insights of KO reduction. However, doing this will
require reconceiving those insights in more contemporary fashion. Our strat-
egy will be to employ some resources developed in current work on causal-
mechanistic explanation.8 We’ll then argue that the resulting KO-inspired
model captures the kind of reductionism illustrated by our case study, better
than any other reduction model in the philosophy of science.
A mechanistic KO reduction will involve reducing one level of mechanism to
another by demonstrating that the lower-level mechanism has an explanatory
8. Kari Theurer developed this KO-inspired account of reduction in her recently
defended doctoral dissertation [Theurer 2012].
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scope at least as great as that of the higher-level mechanism, and that the
resulting trade-off in complexity of the lower-level mechanism is balanced by
this increase in explanatory scope. That is, the lower-level mechanism must
explain all the data that the higher-level mechanism explains, and typically
more, and the increased complexity of these lower-level explanations must not
exceed this increased explanatory scope. In keeping with recent work in “new
mechanistic” philosophy of science, we conceive the levels-ordering relation in
terms of containment, component, or parthood: the parts or components of
a mechanism, performing their activities in organized fashion to generate the
mechanism’s behavior, are at the next level down from the mechanism itself.
And those parts or components may themselves be mechanisms which have
active, organized parts. Those latter parts or components are at the next
mechanistic level down.9
Mechanistic explanation has seen an important revival over the past two
decades. Anti-reductionism is prominent among some influential new mecha-
nists (e.g., [Craver & Kaplan 2011]; but see [Bechtel 2009] for a different view).
But connections between mechanism and reduction were prominent through-
out 20th-century philosophy of science. Some of the strongest defenders of
law-based explanation recognized the importance of reduction via elucidation
of lower-level mechanisms, and they were not alone. Nearly two decades be-
fore the start of mechanism’s current revival, William Wimsatt noticed these
attempts as a genuine kind of reduction:
At least in biology, most scientists see their work as explaining
types of phenomena by discovering mechanisms, rather than ex-
plaining theories by deriving them or reducing them to other the-
ories, and this is seen as reduction, or as integrally tied to it.
[Wimsatt 1976, 671; our emphasis]
Craver himself has made a related point:
Wimsatt [Wimsatt 1976] and Sarkar [Sarkar 1992] recommend
that the term “reduction” be used to describe the explanation of a
phenomenon by its mechanism. Peter Smith [Smith 1992] suggests
that the reductive ideal can be maintained by appeal to “modest
reductions”. Many scientists use the term “reduction” in this way.
[Craver 2007, 18, fn 19]
Craver even suggests that a mechanistic explanation of a phenomenon is
“weakly reductionistic” [Craver 2007]. However, the KO-inspired model we’re
developing here is stronger than what is indicated by most accounts of mech-
anistic explanation. The reason for our model’s increased strength has to do
9. See [Craver 2007, chap. 5]. Craver, for the now-standard account of levels of
mechanisms, with useful diagrams and applied directly to neuroscience examples.
Craver usefully points out, against models of intertheoretic reduction, that levels of
mechanisms don’t always match up well with levels of theory. We agree with him on
this point.
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with one of the central KO insights: increased explanatory power of lower-level
mechanisms in reductive causal-mechanistic explanations.
In the cases that interest us, as we descend downward through nested
mechanisms, opening black boxes at progressively lower levels along the way,
we are uncovering mechanisms that are progressively more explanatory. That
is, we are elucidating mechanisms that allow us to account for increasingly
more observational data. Crucially, in these cases, mechanisms at lower levels
provide explanatory information that is unavailable at higher levels. Lower-
level explanations of cognitive functions of the sort exemplified in molecular
and cellular cognition are paradigmatic examples of this kind of reductive
causal-mechanistic explanation. As we saw in our discussion in section 1 above,
psychological and cognitive level mechanistic explanations of the Ebbinghaus
spacing effect (such that frequent repetitive inputs interfere with complete
integration of information acquired on previous trials) are severely limited in
explanatory scope. They seem to be ad hoc add-ons designed simply to capture
the specific behavioral data characterizing the effect.10 Discovering that the
causal mechanisms of this effect involve the intraneuronal interactions between
an activity-dependent transcriptional enhancer and its inhibiting phosphatase
in the neurons recruited into the memory trace embeds a causal-mechanistic
explanation for the Ebbinghaus effect into the full panoply of explanations
from molecular biology involving these molecules.
This constitutes a huge gain in explanatory scope. CREB and PP1 aren’t
specific to cortical and hippocampal neurons, nor even to neurons. They in-
teract to a variety of effects in a wide range of biological tissues. The discovery
that their interaction causally-mechanistically explains the Ebbinghaus spac-
ing effect now enables us to compare that effect to other biological processes
mechanistically explained by CREB-PP1 interactions. The explanatory scopes
of the best causal-mechanistic cognitive, even cognitive-neuroscientific expla-
nations are, by contrast, greatly limited in scope. They apply only to specific
cognitive systems, or to specific brain regions, or to neurofunctional constructs.
Typically they explain only the behavioral data they are designed to accom-
modate. Finding increasingly lower-level mechanisms for higher-level cognitive
effects brings all the cellular physiology or molecular biology known about the
mechanism into the explanatory fold, along with the behavioral data for the
specific cognitive function. In our example, the CREB-PP1 mechanism for the
Ebbinghaus spacing effect now also accommodates the addition and removal of
10. This is not always true, as Colin Allen reminded us. More sophisticated kinds of
cognitive, including cognitive-neuroscientific modeling, often make connections with
other results, independently of the specific phenomena directly at explanatory issue.
There is also the familiar point that the greater detail offered by the lower-level mech-
anism can obscure explanatory patterns that are more visible at higher levels. But
a mechanized Kemeny-Oppenheim-inspired account of reduction isn’t blind to these
concerns. They’re the very concerns that go into considerations of systematicity: the
trade-off between increased explanatory scope and increased explanatory complexity.
We elaborate on this point a bit more toward the end of this section.
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phosphate groups from the mechanism’s components, configurational changes
in the proteins due to these additions and removals, and connections that the
resulting form of late-phase synaptic plasticity has with CREB-PP1 interac-
tions in other kinds of cells.11 The Genoux results immediately suggest looking
into the role of I1 as a natural inhibitor of cognitive forgetting and of PP1 as
a potential mechanism of cognitive decline with aging. That’s massively in-
creased explanatory scope, actual and potential, over what even a developed
psychological or cognitive-neuroscientific mechanism for the Ebbinghaus spac-
ing effect could provide.
What about the second requirement of a KO reduction, systematization?
Does expressing KO reduction insights using resources from causal-mechanistic
explanation give us any way to assess whether our hypothesized reductive ex-
planations are growing increasingly systematized? Two resources might be
helpful. The first is the distinction among a complete description of a mecha-
nism, a mechanism sketch, and a mechanism schema. A sketch is an incomplete
model of a mechanism that leaves gaps in characterizing its entities, activities,
or their organization. These gaps are marked by black boxes and filler terms.
Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver (MDC) tell us that
a sketch [...] serves to indicate what further work needs to be
done in order to have a mechanism schema [...] [and can serve]
as an abstraction that can be instantiated as needed for the tasks
mentioned above, e.g., explanation, prediction, and experimental
design. [Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000, 18]
Mechanism schemata lie on a spectrum between a complete description of
a mechanism and a sketch. A schema contains more explanatory information
than does a sketch, and schemata closer to complete descriptions contain more
than those further away.
Psychological and cognitive-neuroscientific mechanistic explanations of a
cognitive function are inevitably sketches. Black boxes and filler terms abound.
Cellular and molecular mechanistic explanations, when available, are at least
steps toward schema. Some of those black boxes and filler terms get opened
and filled. This is one kind of increase in explanatory scope that can be com-
pared, at least intuitively, with the added complexity of molecular mechanistic
explanations.
Craver provides the second potentially useful dimension for our purpose
[Craver 2007]. He distinguishes between “how-possibly” and “how-actually”
11. Based on some of the earliest results in the search for cellular and molecular
mechanisms of learning and memory, Eric Kandel recommended that we “conceive of
learning as [...] a late stage of neuronal differentiation” [Kandel 1979, 76]: in other
words, as one of the developmental processes that eventually individuate neurons
from one another! Learning theory joins up with developmental neuroscience to
increase the explanatory scope of both. Who knew?! Certainly nobody who rested
content with psychological or even cognitive-neuroscientific mechanistic explanations
of learning and memory!
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mechanistic models. How-possibly models “are only loosely constrained con-
jectures about the sort of mechanism that might suffice to produce the
explanandum phenomenon. They describe how a set of parts and activities
might be organized together such that they exhibit the explanandum phe-
nomenon” [Craver 2007, 112]. How-possibly models “are often heuristically
useful in constructing and exploring the space of possible mechanisms, but
they are not adequate explanations” [Craver 2007, 112]. How-actually models
lie at the other end of a spectrum, and “describe real components, activi-
ties, and organizational features of the mechanism that in fact produces the
phenomenon” [Craver 2007, 112]. How-plausibly models lie between these
extremes. An experimentally justified case can be offered that some of the
hypothesized components, activities, and organization specified by the how-
plausibly mechanism exist, and could function to generate the behavior to be
explained.
For Craver, a mechanistic explanation’s location on both of these spectra
carries normative implications:
Progress in building mechanistic explanations involves movement
along both the possibly-plausibly-actually axis and along the
sketch-schema-mechanism axis. [Craver 2007, 114]
Progress in neuroscience involves elucidating mechanisms. This process re-
quires showing that possible mechanisms are plausible, even actual, and filling
in black boxes and filler terms in mechanism sketches to produce schemata,
and ideally complete descriptions. These activities usually require elucidating
other mechanisms. In “ruthlessly reductive” scientific fields like MCC, these
other mechanisms are inevitably at a lower level than those of psychology,
cognitive science, even cognitive neuroscience. By both of Craver’s measures,
successful results of this process will yield increased explanatory information:
a schema closer to a complete description of a mechanism, a how-plausibly,
maybe even a how-actually mechanism. This is what we saw demonstrated
in our detailed MCC case study in section 1, and it is exactly the process
of effecting a mechanized KO reduction. Those same intuitions about what
reduction is seem clearly at work in “ruthlessly reductionistic” MCC.
The idea of an explanation sketch is, in fact, another old reductionist idea.
Hempel, for example, describes an explanation sketch as such:
What the explanatory analyses of historical events offer, is, then,
in most cases not an explanation in one of the senses indicated
above, but something that might be called an explanation sketch.
Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the
laws and initial conditions considered as relevant, and it needs
“filling out” in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation. This
filling-out requires further empirical research, for which the sketch
suggests the direction. [Hempel 1965, 238]
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Craver does not locate the roots of his appeal to ‘mechanism sketch’ in Hempel.
But the similarities apparent in the quotes above, including the normative as-
sumptions about better explanations and progress in science, are further repre-
sentative of the shared historical roots of reductionism and mechanism. “New”
mechanism, by the nature of its key resources, may be far more reductionistic
than some of its proponents notice (or admit).
So, do MCC mechanistic explanations, reductive in the fashion described
by our mechanized KO model, increase explanatory systematization? They
certainly increase explanatory scope, both intuitively and along the two di-
mensions emphasized by the new mechanists. But do these increases over-
ride their added “complexity”? Any answer to this question is difficult to
assess. Explanatory complexity is an elusive concept, difficult to measure and
even more difficult to compare with an equally elusive measure like increased
explanatory scope. Explanatory systematization remains very much in the
eye of the beholder. But we shouldn’t confuse complexity with unfamiliarity.
MCC experiments and causal-mechanistic explanations are unfamiliar to most
philosophers and cognitive scientists. The molecular biology and genetics is
typically daunting, especially when expressed in compressed scientific-journal
form. But did you follow the experiments as described in section 1 above? Did
you understand the results and the mechanistic explanation of the Ebbinghaus
spacing effect built on them? When expressed in less compressed form, is the
explanatory complexity of the reductive explanation really so daunting? When
enough of the molecular biology is revealed, is the increase in explanatory com-
plexity really so great? So much that it overcomes the obvious increases in
explanatory scope?
One final point: A KO-inspired account of causal-mechanistic reduction
allows cognitive functions to reduce directly to molecular mechanisms. So
long as the hypothesized mechanism explains all the behavioral data, the psy-
chological kind reduces directly to the molecular components, activities, and
organization. Intervening levels of mechanisms aren’t required, although of
course they’re often developed in the search for increasingly lower-level mech-
anisms. Our KO-inspired model thus differs from Bechtel’s [Bechtel 2009]
“mechanistic reduction” model, which advocates “nested mechanisms within
mechanisms” and limits reductions of a phenomena only to its mechanisms
at the next level down. We don’t find these limitations in actual MCC re-
search (as illustrated by our case study in section 1). So while Bechtel’s
“mechanistic reduction” might correctly characterize what reduction is in
cognitive/systems/behavioral-level neuroscience, we think our KO-inspired ac-
count better captures reduction on the hoof in really reductionistic neurosci-
entific fields.12
12. Bickle has argued for the direct reduction of cognitive functions to cellular-
physiological and molecular-biological mechanisms since his [Bickle 2003, 2006].
Theurer argues that, due to the very notions that define new mechanism, new mech-
anists are likewise committed to “direct” reductions of psychological kinds to their
cellular and molecular mechanisms [Theurer 2012].
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4 Conclusion: Should we be surprised?
KO reduction quickly gave way in mid-20th-century philosophy of science to
“direct” reduction paradigms proposed by Nagel [Nagel 1961] and Schaffner
[Schaffner 1967]. Schaffner’s dismissal of KO reduction was a popular com-
plaint. After giving his revised Nagel derivability condition involving “cor-
rected” T∗R and his “strong analogy” requirement (see section 2 above),
Schaffner insisted that when these conditions fail to obtain,
then one might have to fall back on something like the Kemeny-
Oppenheim paradigm [...] There is no theory relation in this
case—only adequate explanation of the observable predictions of
the previous theory. [Schaffner 1967, 145; our emphases]
This criticism had force when intertheoretic reduction was paradigmatic of
scientific reduction—and not coincidentally, when physics still ruled as the
paradigmatic science for philosophical reflection. As the “new” mechanists
have rightly emphasized, biology, including neuroscience, is less concerned
with theory construction and more concerned with discovering mechanisms.
Despite the initial surprise that an old, widely discredited account of reduc-
tion is actually at work in a “ruthlessly reductionistic” field central to main-
stream current neuroscience, on reflection perhaps our thesis isn’t so surprising.
Theory reduction is certainly less operative in neuroscience than in physics.
Neuroscience doesn’t trade in theories the way physics does. Shouldn’t we
expect, then, that something other than an implicit model of intertheoretic
reduction guides its reductionistic proclivities? Kemeny and Oppenheim’s old
“indirect” reduction paradigm, correctly criticized by mid-20th-century philoso-
phers of science for failing to account adequately for theory reduction, seems
nicely suited to illuminate neuroscience’s continued reductionistic search for
lower-level mechanisms of cognition.
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